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ABSTRACT 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Federal IMD exclusion has resulted in states opting 
to shift costs to the government by enacting inefficient Medicaid programs in order to gain 
federal reimbursement. The claim of “cost-shifting” relies on the assumption that state programs 
are inefficient – that is, that their Medicaid programs are less effective at reducing incarceration 
rates (as a metric for failure to properly treat) than their psychiatric hospitals. Literature in the 
Public Health, Psychiatric, and Criminal Justice fields was surveyed in order to determine 
relevant factors to be included in the model. Model variables include factors which contribute to 
mental illness, criminal data, and relevant state expenditures. Availability of data drove inevitable 
bias in selection of time frame and variables in multiple regressions using data from 2000 to 2010 
across the fifty states. Upon analysis, the data do not support the claims made by the Treatment 
Advocacy Center that the IMD exemption has compromised the welfare of the Mentally Ill.  
However, the bias created by data selection is substantial enough to limit a conclusion of full 
support for the null; ultimately this study confirms the need for a more cross-sectional data on the 
subject. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States federal government’s Medicaid program is a public insurance program 
which provides medical care for individuals with low incomes and disabilities.  Though its 
coverage extends to mental health services, it has the notable exemption of coverage for inpatient 
psychiatric hospitalization at an Institute for Mental Disease.  This distinction has drawn the ire of 
mental health advocates who claim that it creates a perverse incentive for states to expand 
community-based mental health coverage at the expense of medically necessary inpatient care 
(Jaffe & Zdanowicz, 1999).  Advocacy groups such as the Treatment Advocacy Center have 
produced data which states that there are currently more mentally ill individuals in America’s 
prisons than there are in its mental hospitals (Fellner, 2006). 
Mental illness accounts for a substantial portion of human services expenses for the 
federal and state governments of the United States.  By crude estimates, mental illness and 
associated conditions use some 15 percent of Medicaid dollars by way of skilled nursing facilities, 
intermediate care facilities, state hospitals and general hospital psychiatric facilities (Taube, 
Goldman, & Salkever, 1990). In addition to the high Medicaid costs of mental illness, prisons 
certainly are carrying a growing number of mentally ill inmates (Diamond, Wang, Holzer, 
Thomas, & Cruser, 2001). Human rights advocates blame the ineffective provision of mental 
health services for this trend, positing that the trans-institutionalization of the mentally ill is the 
 2 
 
expression of a faulty system (Fellner, 2006).  A survey of academic literature suggests that on 
the macroeconomic level no study has directly examined the factors which affect the proportion 
of mentally ill inmates.  This study takes the approach of holding the null hypothesis that no 
trans-institutionalization has taken place.  By examining data which act as proxies to system 
failures such as violence, homelessness, and incarceration rates, this study will attempt to uncover 
the extent to which the federal IMD exemption affects the state decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The first factor to be analyzed is the nature of the mentally ill population itself.  In a 
broad study by Wells et al., psychiatric disorder was defined as a case of major depression, 
dysthyma, or generalized anxiety disorder, probable panic disorder, or probable severe mental 
illness (as assessed by a positive score on the composite international diagnostic interview stem 
item for lifetime mania or from a report of ever having had an overnight hospital stay for 
psychotic symptoms or of having received a diagnosis of schizophrenia from a physician) (Wells, 
Klap, Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001). This metric is not perfect for an economic analysis because 
the diagnostic measures used for non-serious mental illnesses have a high variance from state to 
state.  Race may be specifically collinear to access to or quality of care, since Wells et al. found 
that racial differences affected access and quality, although the significance of race diminished 
(but did not disappear) when income, marital status and private insurances status were controlled.  
This study’s definition is difficult to quantify across fifty states with differing standards for 
diagnosis, and its focus on ethnic differences in care can be addressed in a macro-level study by 
grouping various study populations by race.  However, the diminished prominence of race when 
accounting for varied factors, the difficulty of tracking racial expression when studying the fifty 
states at a distance, and limited data from state providers make the metric one worth notice but 
not use in this paper.  
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As an alternative to state government-implemented screenings, psychiatric diagnostic 
standards present a more uniform measure of mental illness.  For example, Wang et al. conducted 
a nationwide study which surveyed households and classified mental illness according to the 
standards of the DSM-IV.  They found that the severity of an individual’s mental disorder was a 
significant factor in determining what type of mental health service was used (such as specialty 
mental health providers, general medical health, or talk therapy with a psychiatrist).  The study 
found that the type of care being utilized by individuals has shifted over time, implying that the 
year could substantially affect the structure of care. (Wang, Demler, Olfson, Pincus, Wells, & 
Kessler, 2006). Wang et al. excluded the institutionalized and the homeless from their survey, 
which represents a problem for use in a study of trans-institutionalization given the high 
prevalence of mental illness among the non-surveyed population.  Moreover, their emphasis on 
individual care-seeking patterns did little to address the incentive structure that drives state 
systems of care.  A broader analysis can circumvent these problems by taking into account rates 
of homelessness across states.  This not only serves as a means of capturing access to that 
population but can also test the relationship between homelessness, crime, and mental illness.  A  
linear relationship between the prevalence of mental illness and the homeless population is 
asserted by Wells, et al. and establishes a dependent variable with which data from 2006 may be 
analyzed (Wells, Klap, Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001). 
McAlpine & Mechanic confirm that the severely mentally ill population is skewed by 
race, marital status, sex, education level, and family income, and that 3/5ths of its population 
received no specialty care. They also find that the severely mentally ill have a comparatively low 
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degree of insurance coverage and that 37 percent of the seriously ill population received Medicaid 
or Medicare, which increased the likelihood of reception of specialty care by a factor of six 
(McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000).  The researchers used the Healthcare for Communities survey, 
which is a national study that tracks alcohol, drug and mental health services utilization by 
conducting a telephone survey in 60 communities across the United States.  This source of data 
seems to be of great value to many researchers in the literature, but has limited cross-state 
comparison.  Moreover, the survey data has a high cost as it is private, and the affordability of 
data is a premium in this study. However, it does bring to bear an attack on the notion of a 
perverse incentive; even if community-based mental health services are sub-par to mental 
hospitals, their greater affordability and wider coverage may be an effective means of allocation 
by the metric of reducing homelessness or incarceration, because they allow individuals to 
maintain Medicaid coverage at relatively low cost to the state.   
Medicaid is especially prevalent in the provision of services to the indigent mentally ill, 
but estimates of federal expenditures are fairly crude (Taube, Goldman, & Salkever, 1990).  
Taube et al. use the size of the enrolled population and break down Medicaid-using population 
into heavy, episodic, and persistent users when analyzing data. The services utilized by each 
population tended to vary, so while this study cannot track the type of user, it can include a 
variable for the budget and availability of specialty services.  These services could be divided 
between state institutions and community institutions.  The former do not receive Medicaid 
reimbursements from patients; the latter do. 
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A commonly occurring standard for designating an individual as having a serious mental 
illness was a diagnosis of schizophrenia or Major Affective Disorder along with at least one 
inpatient or two outpatient treatment contacts for such diagnosis was used to count serious mental 
illness.  In one stuch study, utilization rates for Medicaid and line-item cost of care were used to 
determine the financial impact of serious mental illness (Rothbard, Metraux, & Blank, 2003). 
In another study by Soumeral et al., Medicaid enrollment files were controlled for age, 
race, sex, and monthly category of enrollment.  Medicaid drug claims and psychiatric admissions 
of patients with schizophrenia were available for use in the study and represent a clear path to the 
utilization of Medicaid services in the United States.  Because Medicaid does not cover inpatient 
psychiatric hospitals with more than 16 beds, medical records were used to track individual 
admission to hospitals (Soumerai, McLaughlin, Ross-Degnan, Casteris, & Bollini, 1994).  The 
study may have been skewed by a medication cap in place in New Hampshire at the time, 
suggesting that data should use medical caps as a variable.  Because this study does not aim to 
track individual patients but rather the larger structures that affect broader trends, hospital 
utilization rates, which are available for state-operated institutions but do not offer individual data, 
should suffice as a metric for estimating access to inpatient care.  Utilization rates were limited in 
comparison to cross-sectional data, but later assumptions demonstrate the use of state 
expenditures as a proxy. 
Wells et al. found that publicly insured minorities were reported as more likely to make 
use of available mental health services than their non-Hispanic white counterparts (Wells, Klap, 
 7 
 
Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001), further confirming the need for racial data by state.  Census data 
tracks race in a way that provides a solid baseline but is so limited in its application that race 
becomes a question of estimate rather than certainty for a study between 2000 and 2009. 
Substance abuse is another factor which has substantial interaction with the mentally ill 
(Drake, et al., 2001), so availability of substance abuse counseling and the per capita allocation 
for substance abuse rehabilitation should be controlled.  For impacts helpful and harmful, states 
include substance abuse treatment in expenditure lists for mental illness.  The collinear 
relationship between the two factors makes it difficult to disentangle one from the other, but may 
not be a problem, considering how much the two have in common. 
An analysis of the interplay between mental health services and incarceration rates must 
control for environmental factors that affect behavior.  Mental illness is generally associated with 
low socio-economic status, which in itself may be a causal factor for contact with the criminal 
justice system.  A study by Draine et al., which focused on the role poverty played alongside 
mental illness and criminal justice interaction, found that when status is put into the criminal 
activity regression, the significance of mental illness is reduced.  Despite seeming to decrease the 
importance of mental health, Draine et al. focused primarily on tracking individuals rather than 
the structural factors that exist on the macroeconomic level (Draine, Salzer, Culhane, & Hadley, 
2002).  The relationship between social status, mental illness, and crime is an important one but 
by no means does it delegitimize the importance of examining the relationship between 
generosity of the state mental health services program and incarceration rates, especially given 
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the resistance of severe mental illnesses to treatment and the widespread secondary impacts of 
effective care.  Gross State Product, Food Stamp Programs, and employment are all valid 
measures for mental illness.  The Food Stamp Program seems most appropriate as it measures 
levels of low poverty without bias from high-income individuals. 
The hypothesis that the size and scope of a mental health program affect incarceration 
rates should be compared to the assertions of Draine et al. by adding income level to the equation.  
Ideally this could be done by listing the mean and median incomes of the incarcerated mentally ill 
and general population and by listing the mean and median incomes of the control population and 
mentally ill population outside of prison.  However, income data is typically gained from a survey 
and the mentally ill population is disproportionately indigent; this data could be extremely 
difficult to gather in certain states depending on how much effort goes into surveying the 
homeless and transient populations as well as the threshold for privacy.  Privacy concerns, while 
justified, make patient tracking extremely difficult, so this study ought to focus on broader trends 
in income level on the state-by-state level. 
Access to medication is a significant component of the effectiveness of the Medicaid 
program.  Soumeral et al. found that a cap on the amount of medication covered by Medicaid had 
a profound impact on incarceration and homelessness rates, and that lifting the cap brought those 
rates back to baseline (Soumerai, McLaughlin, Ross-Degnan, Casteris, & Bollini, 1994).  
Soumeral et al. focused specifically on individual medication need and were able to make use of 
medicine claims.   Once again Medicaid data can be helpful in obtaining this information, 
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although this study will not track individual increase or decrease in medication across time.  As of 
this writing, an adequate measure for medication could not be found, but the importance of 
medication to a policymaker requires that the search be continued. 
Contact with the criminal justice system increases the likelihood of receiving specialty 
care by a factor of four for the seriously mentally ill (McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000).  There are a 
growing number of individuals with mental illness in prison, but there are confounding factors 
such as an overall increase in arrest rates and new legislation that increases the time offenders 
spend in prison (Diamond, Wang, Holzer, Thomas, & Cruser, 2001).  Diamond et al. indicated 
that federal law requires a basic screening for mental illness in all new inmates but that further 
studies within the population were subject to varying observational biases.  Another study found 
that within prisons, gender affected whether services are provided, to the point that Baskin et al. 
argue that gender is a stronger predictor for the type or quality of mental health services provided 
than a prisoner’s clinical status (Baskin, Sommers, Tessler, & Steadman, 1989).  Gender 
breakdown within each service system should be utilized to address this bias.  Although prison 
mental health services may not be as ideal as non-prison mental services, their prevalence may 
make statistical significance difficult to determine.  If the dependent variable of a study is 
imprisonment, one could argue that both a positive and negative relationship between 
incarceration rates and mental health treatment are possible. 
It is clear that the environment surrounding the mentally ill in American society is a fairly 
complex one.  The review in literature suggests that these individuals have a high degree of 
 10 
 
contact with government services ranging from healthcare to broader social services to prison.  
Most studies in the literature focus on tracking individuals in order to focus on quality of care.  
Those that focused on broader questions attempted to glean from data a particular question such 
as the true size of the mentally ill prison population.  The survey conducted was not inconsistent 
with anecdotal findings that indicate the need for mental health services and the relationship 
between treatment and incarceration.  This implies a model whereby the dependent variable is an 
expression of “system failure” such as homelessness or incarceration.  Independent variables 
attempt to capture state-controllable efforts representing the variables that affect the mentally ill 
individual.  State budgets are separately considered as independent variables and include the 
following: State expenditures within the prison system, state expenditures on mental hospitals, 
state expenditures on community-based mental health care, the size of the overall state Medicaid 
and Medicare programs, Other independent variables not directly within state control but 
significant to the model include Gross State Product, population, and the federal Medicaid match 
ratio. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 The majority of data for this study was provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation, which 
collects, aggregates, and publishes data from the fifty states, the District of Colombia, and 
American territories free to the public  (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011).  Data collected 
included the following: Distribution of population by federal poverty level for the year 2009, the 
average number of monthly food stamp participants for the years 2002-2010, Distribution of 
General fund spending for the year 2009, Gross State Product for the years 2002 and 2005-2009, 
the Adult population in state prisons for the years 1999-2009, total Medicaid spending for the 
year 2009, Violent crime per 100,000 persons for the year 2009, Homeless population estimates 
for 2009, expenses per inpatient day for hospitals for the year 2009, per-capita state mental health 
agency expenditures for the year 2006, and the number of mental health care organizations for the 
years 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000.  The National Association of State Mental Health Program 
Directors, which has extensive data specific to mental health care for recent years, provided 
information on Medicaid beneficiaries and payments for the year 2006, the Federal Medicaid 
Multiplier for the years 2004-2008, and state expenditures for hospital care and community-based 
care for the years 2006-2008 (NASMHPD Research Institute, 2007). 
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 Gaps in data led to reductions in regression potential.  Multiple studies were run to test 
the existence of a standing relationship similar to that indicated in literature.  Since 2006 and 
2009 had the most extensive data, each was subjected to a cross-sectional study of available 
factors.  For the years for which federal Medicaid reimbursement rates were known, a 
rudimentary panel was used to examine the relationship between federal rates and state provision 
of mental health services. 
 The following models were tested: 
Mental Health Spending per Capita as a linear function of GSP per capita, the cost of overall 
hospital inpatient care per day, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006 
Crime per capita as a linear function of mental health spending per capita, GSP per capita, the 
natural log of state population, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006 
Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the state 
corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita Medicaid 
spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009 
State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community care, the 
federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel data for 
years 2006-2008 
State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State 
Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 separately 
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 Tests were run for heteroskedasticity.  Because of the ease with which it can be viewed 
alongside the standard regression, White’s correction for heteroskedasticity was run on each 
model.
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Figure 3.1: Descriptive statistics for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 
2006 
Variable Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Food Stamps 514152.53 543407.40       24236 2622548.00 
GSP 257584.67      320215.89       23651 1800779.00 
HospExpens 1545.03    366.4776991   773.5700000       2455.24 
FedMedicaidShare 0.6034898      0.0790014      0.5000000      0.7600000 
IncarcerationRate 409.0000000   143.2106549   151.0000000   846.0000000 
Prisoners 27198.14       35808.58        1363.00      175512.00 
StateHospitalCare 167.1020408   208.2102548    15.0000000       1108.00 
CommunityCare 425.0816327   670.1380404    21.0000000       3519.00 
 
2007 
Variable Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Food Stamps 510407.53      525394.36       22608.00     2422198.00 
GSP 273660.43      336751.31       24284.00     1883679.00 
HospExpens 1616.05    399.2385988   869.1239350       2489.63 
FedMedicaidShare 0.5972857      0.0823439      0.5000000      0.7589000 
IncarcerationRate 403.2040816   144.4166397   159.0000000   865.0000000 
Prisoners 27031.78       35929.07        174282.00 174282.00 
StateHospitalCare 180.3151020   222.2826171    16.9500000       1173.20 
CommunityCare 473.1951020   761.1291599    22.2600000       3860.35 
 
2008 
Variable Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Food Stamps 546780.69      566171.27       22608.00     2532047.00 
GSP 277665.08 344670.96       25225.00     1921493.00 
HospExpens 1715.06    398.7669916   928.9800000       2512.19 
FedMedicaidShare 0.5986204      0.0809993      0.5000000      0.7629000 
IncarcerationRate 412.5102041   147.0225496   151.0000000   853.0000000 
Prisoners 27816.43       1452.00      173670.00 173670.00 
StateHospitalCare 187.0216327   242.2638610    10.8400000      1207.30 
CommunityCare 518.6818367   823.4734073    23.6100000       4267.21 
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2009 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
% of Population below 
100 % of poverty level 
0. 1766857      0.0380818      0.1072203      0.2776364 
% of population below 
125% of poverty level 
0.0734193      0.0116562      0.0474861      0.0991997 
% of population 
receiving food stamps 
666776.90      682274.95 26762.00     3003156.00 
Medicaid spending (in 
millions) 
2067.26        2646.49    142.0000000       11707.00 
Corrections spending 
(in millions) 
944.0200000        1417.22     67.0000000        9316.00 
Total spending (in 
millions) 
13134.44       15793.13        1153.00       90940.00 
GSP (in millions) 281033.96      337513.93       25438.00     1891363.00 
Total medical spending 
(state and non-state, 
absolute-dollar) 
7296897552 9308572364 526237765 49368510253 
Violent crimes per 
100,000 civilians 
382.0340000    158.5698952    119.8000000    702.2000000 
Homelessness (%) 0.2152000      0.1727005      0.0700000      1.0400000 
Medicaid spending on 
Mental Health (%) 
0.0350829      0.0327000              0 0.1230674 
Federal Medicaid 
Multiplier 
.7000620 .0725347 0.5878000 0.8424000 
Population 5554885.14 6223254.09 345064.00 33871648 
Medicaid Spending 
Per-Capita 
1466.26 1482.26 692.1049750 11411.23 
Corrections Spending 
Per-Capita (in millions) 
0.000187160    0.000192895    0.000070401      0.0014519 
GSP Per-Capita (in 
millions) 
0.0575508      0.0568705      0.0337141      0.4456507 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The literature review served not only to direct data collection but also the assumptions of the 
model when interpreting that data.  From the literature, the following assumptions were made. 
Assumption 1: States will opt for the most efficient cost-benefit ratio possible.  Claims of 
perverse incentives only function insofar as state officers react to those incentives in an attempt to 
maximize their utility. 
Assumption 2: Untreated mental illness will express itself via a “social harm.”  Note that this 
assumption is not that all untreated mental illness expresses itself so, but that the rate at which 
this does so should be constant or with a zero-error term across the states. 
Assumption 3: Unmeasured variables not within state control have an error term of zero.  This 
assumption is purely pragmatic and necessary for analysis of the model, but accounts for potential 
variation in the true mentally ill population of states.  The assumption is that the distribution 
across fifty observations is normal. 
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Assumption 4:  Spending is a sufficient proxy for quality of care by the states.  A conversation 
about healthcare economics with Dr. Zimmer of the WKU economics department indicated that 
spending is not a perfect measure but is often the best when conducting this type of study.  
 
Figure 4.1: The Underlying Model 
 
 
Serious Mental Illness 
Crime 
Unemployment 
Incarceration 
Quality of Treatment 
 
State Priorities 
Medicaid 
 
US Federal Government 
 
Exogenous factors: 
GSP 
Poverty 
Population 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Mental Health Spending per Capita as a linear function of GSP per capita, the cost of 
overall hospital inpatient care per day, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 
2006 
This model was run to test the relationship which exists between the state and the size of 
the treatment budget.  While the null was one of no relationship, the theory was that Medicaid 
would sabotage this relationship and exhibit a negative correlation once other factors were held 
constant. 
Figure 5.1 indicates a study of all 50 states in 2006 which meets the expected 
directionality of most items. According to the linear model, an increase in GSP per capita is 
accompanied with a marginal increase in mental health spending per capita, although the amount 
by which it does so is negligible and below the value of statistical significance.  Likewise, the 
federal Medicaid multiplier has a negative correlation with mental health expenditure per capita, 
albeit it too is not statistically significant.  The variable for inpatient costs in hospitals, designed 
to measure the effect of hospital costs on state choice, seems to have a positive correlation with 
mental health spending, going against what we know about the law of demand.  To add insult to 
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injury, it has the largest t value in the entire regression.  Critical T for rejection of the null was 
2.02; no factor in the model meets this threshold. This last variable can be explained if one 
assumes that assumption 1 was not entirely correct.  Public choice would indicate that states, 
unlike private entities, set goals in a manner which is insular to the law of demand.  In this case, it 
makes sense that high-cost states spend more on treatment – they are simply absorbing the higher 
costs directly into their budgets. 
The R-square and adjusted R-square values are not surprising in this context. 
The Adjusted R-square value of .0684 demonstrates how ineffective the model is at explaining 
state mental health spending.  Omitted variable bias is likely an explanation for the factor on 
inpatient costs, but even with such a variable, the situation is not as clear-cut as the Treatment 
Advocacy Center indicates. This tenuous relationship certainly highlights the value of continued 
observation, but casts doubt on later models which are predicated on the assumption that the 
Medicaid program’s influence is greater than it truly is.
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Figure 5.1: Mental Health Agency Spending per capita as a function of GSP per capita, Inpatient 
Hospital costs, and the federal share of Medicaid spending 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept 103.82821 0.62 
GSP Per-Capita 0.00072789 0.47 
Inpatient Treatment Costs 0.02980 1.12 
Federal Medicaid Share -126.33514 -0.76 
R-Square = 0.1255; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0684 
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Crime per capita as a linear function of mental health spending per capita, GSP per capita, 
the natural log of state population, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006 
This model is a test of the treatment programs themselves, and relies on the assumption 
of expression.  Theory posits that untreated mental illness expresses itself via crime, 
unemployment, and homelessness.  Adequate treatment is often defended on the grounds that it 
keeps the mentally ill out of prison.  The regression does not seem to indicate that the mental 
health system has a significant impact on crime per capita, but findings are nevertheless 
interesting. 
The model seems to be much more explanatory than the previous, with an R-square value 
of .396 and an adjusted R-square of .342.  Critical T remains at 2.02 for rejection of the null with 
95 percent confidence.  Among the variables, mental health spending per-capita holds a sign 
consistent with expectations in that a marginal increase in such spending is accompanied with a 
decrease of -.00000287 violent crimes per 100,000 individuals, or -.287 per capita.  However, 
with a t value of -.84, it is not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.  The value of GSP per-
capita has a small but highly significant relationship with crime, yet runs in the opposite direction 
of prevailing theory that wealth decreases incentives to crime.  This measure does not take into 
account stratification of state wealth, however, and should not be taken on its own as a rejection 
of common theory on this relationship.  For instance, states with high wealth and high poverty 
(such as New York) may experience greater crime than states with lower overall wealth but far 
less poverty.  The variable for the natural log of population demonstrates that a growth in state 
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population by one percent is accompanied with an increase in violent crime on the order of .126 
incidents per 100,000 people. With a t-value of 2.53, it also exceeds the critical threshold for 
rejection of the null, and seems to fit the notion that higher-population states have more 
opportunities to bump shoulders.  The federal Medicaid multiplier, which measures the amount of 
Medicaid costs in the state borne by the federal government, is also statistically significant in its 
positive relationship with crime.  According to the model, a percentage point increase in the 
federal share is accompanied with an increase of .0196 violent acts per 100,000 citizens.  
Although such a finding makes this researcher happy, odd directionality in the rest of the model is 
a call to skepticism. Moreover, the inability of the previous model to demonstrate the federal 
Medicaid program’s ability to sway state decision-making makes it difficult to take this 
conclusion as causal evidence rather than incidental.  More research is needed. 
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Figure 5.2: Violent crimes per 100,000 citizens as a function of state mental health spending per-
capita, GSP per capita, the natural log of the population, and the federal government share of 
Medicaid spending, 2006 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -0.02337 -3.80 
MHA Spending Per-Capita -0.00000287 -0.84 
GSP Per-Capita 0.000000186 4.90 
Log(Population) 0.00126 2.53 
Federal Share of Medicaid 0.01957 4.73 
R-Square = 0.3957; Adjusted R-Square = 0.3419 
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Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the state 
corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita 
Medicaid spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009 
This model is another expression of the previous, this time using violent crime (a favored 
statistic, since violent crime is somewhat less rational and a better measure of untreated severe 
mental illness) as the dependent variable.  Poverty data was available for this year and was an 
input for violent crime to hold external variables constant. 
Adjusted R-squared for this model is .29, indicating that statistically significant variables 
in the model are worth the attention of policymakers.  For the model, the impact of Medicaid on 
crime is dwarfed by that of poverty.  The corrections budget has a weak but positive correlation 
with violent crime rates as one would expect.  Since corrections affects violence by working to 
deter it while violence encourages the state to expand the program, it is not surprising to find that 
each thousand-dollar increase in per-capita corrections spending is accompanied with an increase 
of .583 crimes per 100,000 citizens.  The t-value is below significance, likely due to a conflicted 
relationship between the variables. The variable for poverty is absurd, with an indication that an 
increase in the poverty rate by one percent accounts for an additional 2398 crimes per 100,000 
citizens, an unrealistically large number.  At 4.32, its t-value is above the rate for rejection of the 
null.  That this is unrealistic number is the most significant variable seems to indicate a flaw in 
the model more than anything else – all data here should be treated with skepticism.  Medicaid 
spending per capita has a weak but negative relationship on crime.  According to the model, an 
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increase in 1000 medicaid dollars per capita is correlated with a decrease of -.0379 violent crimes 
per 1,000 people.  With a t-value of -.7, it fails to meet our needs for rejection of the null. The 
marginal thousand-dollar increase in GSP per capita accounts for an increase of .00341 violent 
crimes per 100,000 citizens.  With a t-value of 1.29, it fails to reject the null of the relationship.  
The implications of this model are that state policymakers are still likely correct to focus their 
efforts at relieving poverty in order to reduce crime.  The rhetoric of the Treatment Advocacy 
Center, which attempts to use crime studies to bring citizen concern to their interests, could 
backfire if violence prevention becomes the justification for mental health policy.  States have a 
responsibility to provide adequate care for the severely mentally ill, but their other priorities may 
necessitate spending more time focusing on the factors that greatly influence crime; a hard lesson 
for mental illness advocates.
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Figure 5.3: Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the 
state corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita 
Medicaid spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -256.83982 -1.49 
Corrections Spending Per-
Capita 0.58340 1.46 
% below poverty line 2398.54290 4.32 
Medicaid spending per-capita -0.03785 -0.70 
GSP Per-Capita 0.00341 1.29 
R-Square = 0.3512; Adjusted R-Square = 0.2935 
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State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community care, 
the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel 
data for years 2006-2008 
This random effects panel was conducted from 2006 to 2008 across states because of the 
tumultuous time period that took place during the observations.  The bubble in 2006, which burst 
in 2007, led to the start of a rough economic crisis in 2008.  By assuming that state identities and 
priorities were radically changed during this time, the model held that external factors were at 
play. 
The purpose of this model was to test state responsiveness to federal Medicaid incentives 
over time.  If the literature review is true, an increase in the federal share of Medicaid should 
encourage states to increase the share of community-based care at the expense of their state-run 
institutions, which are not Medicaid-eligible.  The basic panel regression finds that an m-value of 
9.62 is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis for the model at 95 percent confidence.  However, 
while the federal share of Medicaid expenditures has a negative correlation with state hospital 
expenditures, the t-value is nowhere near the rejection range and cannot be counted on to explain 
the model.  The presence of community care, which is collinear, indicates very simply that large 
states spend more on both programs, and after examination the decision was made to run a second 
panel regression which used the ratio of state-to-community care as a dependent variable rather 
than have a factor which could take significance from other factors.  It is nevertheless worth 
noting that aside from the weak correlation with hospital expenses, gross state product was also a 
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strong predictor, meaning that states tend to spend on mental health with some consistency to the 
overall budget.
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Figure 5.4: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community 
care, the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel 
data for years 2006-2008. (RanTwo estimation method) 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept 7.529864 0.07 
CMHC spending 0.077502 4.56 
Federal Medicaid Share -80.2261 -0.51 
GSP 0.00053 7.49 
Hospital Expenses 0.02352 1.07 
R-Square = 0.5484 
 30 
 
State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, 
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the years 2006, 2007, and 
2008 separately 
In order to better understand the data within the panel, each year was run as a separate 
regression in addition to the original model.  If the IMD exemption truly exhibits a perverse 
incentive that affects state calculus, the relationship ought to express itself in multiple models.  
In the year 2006, Gross State Product remains the most significant predictor of state 
expenditures on hospital care.  With a t-value of 4.3 and a rejection threshold of 2.2, the marginal 
value of GSP, small as it may be, is strong.  The federal government’s Medicaid share is once 
again weak but negative, establishing a pattern in this research of non-rejection yet justifying the 
call for further study.  The t-value of -1.24 does not give sufficient reason to claim that the 
model’s prediction that a percentage point increase in federal share decreases state expenditures 
on hospital care by 296 dollars.  The variable for food stamps, which attempted to get at the 
measure for poverty, has a t value of 0.04 and is not sufficiently intriguing to warrant discussion. 
The R-square adjusted value of .729 certainly gives the model some credibility, though it seems 
to be overshadowed by GSP. 
For the year 2007, the R-square of the model drops while the adjusted R-square increases 
to .755. For the model GSP is once again highly significant, the federal share in Medicaid is weak 
but negative (this time representing a 254 dollar decrease in state hospital funding for each 
percentage point rise in federal government Medicaid share), and food stamps remain 
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insignificant. However, heteroskedasticity is confirmed with a chi-square value of 29.72.  With 
white’s correction, conclusions based on t-values do not change, although the federal Medicaid 
share gains some small bonus to significance with a t-value of -1.39. 
For the year 2008, R-square and adjusted R-square valued increase such that adjusted R-
square is .794.  Data once again confirms GSP as the most significant variable, federal Medicaid 
share as negative but weak, and food stamps as insignificant.   
Per-capita data was not available over the course of the regression.  The normal method 
of utilizing census data and finding an estimate for population was not satisfactory during the 
time period because of the unpredictability of population movement over the course of the 
financial crisis.  Instead, large factors that exist independent of per-capita data were used.  While 
this reduces bias and the amount of guesswork involved, it also makes it more difficult for models 
to escape the role of raw population size. 
Note the decreasing significance of the Medicaid program over the course of time.  This 
could imply that a former perverse incentive is reaching a plateau – it may have been a major 
factor in the past, and is only beginning to dwindle.  Data used for this paper is unable to 
comment either way on the potential “plateau effect” but does serve to indicate an area ripe for 
future research.
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Figure 5.5: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, 
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2006 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept 208.83356 1.42 
Federal Share of Medicaid -296.51523 -1.24 
GSP 0.00052701 4.30 
% of Population on Food 
Stamps 0.00000284 0.04 
R-Square = 0.7462; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7293 
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Figure 5.6: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, 
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2007 (after White’s 
Correction for Heteroskedasticity (p=.05)) 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept 180.29283 1.78 
Federal Share of Medicaid -254.69513 -1.39 
GSP 0.00055408 4.25 
% of Population on Food 
Stamps 0.00000102 0.01 
R-Square = 0.7700; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7546 
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Figure 5.7: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, 
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2008 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept 143.79093 1.00 
Federal Share of Medicaid -203.69566 -0.86 
GSP 0.00066798 5.26 
% of Population on Food 
Stamps 0.000003714 -0.50 
R-Square = 0.8064; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7935 
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IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid costs and 
Gross State Product, 2006 through 2008 
 
A model that attempts to explain state ratio of IMD spending to community care spending 
by the federal government’s Medicaid share is surprisingly ineffective, giving paucity to anybody 
assuming that the federal government and not the states are responsible for institutional shifts.  
Conclusions on the strength of federal share and GSP remain the same as in the prior discussion 
with the simple alteration that the model no longer enjoys the simple benefit from the relationship 
between GSP and raw program size.   
The motives for the simple model were to examine on the broader level whether or not a 
basic relationship existed.  Of course, other variables greatly affect the output of the model, but 
the extremely low R-Square values indicate that advocates should focus their time on matters 
other than the Medicaid exemption, which appears to have little impact in modern times on state 
expenditures.  In fact, from 2006 to 2008, the federal share of Medicaid had a positive 
relationship on state expenditure on IMDs, contrary to the expectations of the model.  Perhaps 
states do set their agendas independent of the influence of the federal government.  Once more 
one thinks of public choice analysis, whereby the state does not respond to incentives the way a 
rational market actor would.
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Figure 5.8: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid 
costs and Gross State Product, 2006 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -0.11377 -0.24 
Federal Share of Medicaid 1.16442 -1.54 
GSP 0.0000000589796 -0.32 
R-Square = 0.0663; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0257 
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Figure 5.9: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid 
costs and Gross State Product, 2007 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -0.09247 -0.19 
Federal Share of Medicaid 1.08157 1.39 
GSP 0.0000000250173 -0.14 
R-Square = 0.0496; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0073 
 
 38 
 
Figure 5.10: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid 
costs and Gross State Product, 2008 
Variable Coefficient T-value 
Intercept -0.0228 -0.01 
Federal Share of Medicaid 0.87379 1.32 
GSP 0.000000004274 -0.03 
R-Square = 0.0410; Adjusted R-Square = -0.0007 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Conclusions can be difficult to draw even for models that were statistically significant 
due to bias in data selection.  A longer view on the time frame of events may yield greater 
understanding than the experiment conducted here.  Advocates for mental health reform can opt 
to either take the findings as a sign of the reversal of an old trend or as a call for improved study.  
This researcher believes the truth to be some combination of the two. 
 Without statistical significance in any area, the federal government’s share in Medicaid 
does not seem to be the strongest predictor of state actions nor is it predictive of the actions of 
society at large, where one would expect the mentally ill to express gaps in treatment.  Three 
explanations are possible: No relationship exists, a relationship exists but was obscured by bias in 
the data, or a relationship exists but was obscured by an assumption which is not true.  Perhaps 
the mentally ill do not gain treatment the same way that one would expect, or perhaps they do not 
act out in predictable ways when their illness remains untreated.  Moreover, perhaps states are 
now more genuinely concerned with high-quality care than they are with bending to the Medicaid 
incentives put forth by the federal government.  However, one should not be brash to make such a 
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call one way or another.  Instead, future research projects should attempt to better examine the 
assumptions which are anecdotally common but rare on the macroeconomic level. 
 Maintenance of the null is also a call to skepticism of those who use claims of a 
relationship to advocate their legislative agenda.  It is entirely understandable why a mental 
health treatment advocate would claim that the federal IMD exclusion in Medicaid causes 
problems, yet economists have a duty to examine these claims.  At the same time that we 
approach matters of advocacy with healthy skepticism, the data should not stand in the place of a 
meaningful discussion on federal policies.  That many mentally ill live in our nation’s jails is 
undeniable, and so long as the criminalization of mental illness is widespread, clarification and 
research are in the best interests of all. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FUTURE WORK 
 
 Missing data and inability to accurately break state expenditures into per-capita variables 
prevent the null confirmation to have a lasting effect.  Future work in the area should begin with 
wider availability of data on the behalf of the states.  If the small investment of increasing 
availability were made, economists and advocates alike would be better-positioned to make 
rational claims with lasting merit. 
 Survey methods were the most frequently used by treatment advocates, which has 
contributed to the lack of working data for this study.  Great attention must be given to the 
macroeconomic variables that affect the state’s relationship with mental illness.  For instance, 
accurate data on hospital beds is more available for the decade 1990-2000 than from 2000-2010, 
but is harder to study due to the lack of readily accessible data for the most recent decade. 
 Greater emphasis will be given to studying alternative models of expression – for 
instance, adding to the model which predicts homelessness, as data on the phenomenon is 
becoming magnitudes more accurate and accessible.  This variable should be preferred over 
violence because it seems to be less immune to the culture of one state, more responsive to law 
than to culture, and because mental illness accounts for a larger proportion of the homeless 
population.  A robust model of this sort would likely reflect the true nature of the Federal 
Medicaid incentive structure’s authority over state expenditure. 
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